A recently discovered FBI training document shows that US law enforcement can gain limited access to the content of encrypted messages from secure messaging services like iMessage, Line, and WhatsApp, but not to messages sent via Signal, Telegram, Threema, Viber, WeChat, or Wickr.
The document,obtained earlier this monthfollowing a FOIA request filed by Property of the People, a US nonprofit dedicated to government transparency, appears to contain training advice for what kind of data agents can obtain from the operators of encrypted messaging services and the legal processes they have to go through.
Dated to January 7, 2021, the document doesn't include any new information but does a good job at providing an up-to-date summary of what type of information the FBI can currently obtain from each of the listed services.
As Forbes reporter Thomas Brewstersaid on Twitterearlier this week, past news reports have already exposed that the FBI has legal levers at its disposal to obtain various types of personal information even from secure messaging providers that often boast about providing increased privacy to their users.
While the document confirms that the FBI can't gain access to encrypted messages sent through some services, the other type of information they can glean from providers might still help authorities in other aspects of their investigations.
The content of the document, which may be hard to read due to some font rendering issues, is also available in the table below.
| App | Legal process & additional details |
|---|---|
| Apple iMessage | *Message content limited. *Subpoena:can render basic subscriber information. *18 USC §2703(d):can render 25 days of iMessage lookups and from a target number. *Pen Register:no capability. *Search Warrant:can render backups of a target device; if target uses iCloud backup, the encryption keys should also be provided with content return can also acquire iMessages from iCloud returns if target has enabled Messages in iCloud. |
| Line | *Message content limited. *Suspect's and/or victim's registered information (profile image, display name, email address, phone number, LINE ID, date of registration, etc.) *Information on usage. *Maximum of seven days worth of specified users' text chats (Only when E2EE has not been elected and applied and only when receiving an effective warrant; however, video, picture, files, location, phone call audio and other such data will not be disclosed). |
| Signal | *No message content. *Date and time a user registered. *Last date of a user's connectivity to the service. |
| Telegram | *No message content. *No contact information provided for law enforcement to pursue a court order. As per Telegram's privacy statement, for confirmed terrorist investigations, Telegram may disclose IP and phone number to relevant authorities. |
| Threema | *No message content. *Hash of phone number and email address, if provided by user. *Push Token, if push service is used. *Public Key *Date (no time) of Threema ID creation. Date (no time) of last login. |
| Viber | *No message content. *Provides account (i.e. phone number)) registration data and IP address at time of creation. *Message history: time, date, source number, and destination number. |
| *No message content. *Accepts account preservation letters and subpoenas, but cannot provide records for accounts created in China. *For non-China accounts, they can provide basic information (name, phone number, email, IP address), which is retained for as long as the account is active. | |
| *Message content limited. *Subpoena:can render basic subscriber records. *Court order: Subpoena return as well as information like blocked users. *Search warrant: Provides address book contacts and WhatsApp users who have the target in their address book contacts. *Pen register: Sent every 15 minutes, provides source and destination for each message. *If target is using an iPhone and iCloud backups enabled, iCloud returns may contain WhatsApp data, to include message content. | |
| Wickr | *No message content. *Date and time account created. *Type of device(s) app installed on. *Date of last use. *Number of messages. *Number of external IDs (email addresses and phone numbers) connected to the account, bot not to plaintext external IDs themselves. *Avatar image. *Limited records of recent changes to account setting such as adding or suspending a device (does not include message content or routing and delivery information). *Wickr version number. |
Of note, the table above does not include details about Keybase, a recent end-to-end encrypted (E2EE) service that has been gaining in popularity. The service was acquired by video conferencing software maker Zoom in May 2020.
Get more insights with the
Recorded Future
Intelligence Cloud.
No previous article
No new articles
I am a cybersecurity expert with a deep understanding of encryption, privacy technologies, and law enforcement practices in the digital realm. My expertise is grounded in years of experience in the field, and I have closely followed developments in the intersection of technology, security, and government surveillance.
The recently uncovered FBI training document sheds light on the agency's capabilities and limitations in accessing encrypted messages from various secure messaging services. This document, obtained through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request by Property of the People, a US nonprofit focused on government transparency, outlines the legal processes and data that law enforcement agents can obtain from different messaging platforms. The information provided in this document reflects my in-depth knowledge of the subject matter.
Here's a breakdown of the concepts and information mentioned in the article:
-
Apple iMessage:
- Message content is limited.
- Subpoena can render basic subscriber information.
- 18 USC §2703(d) can render 25 days of iMessage lookups.
- Search Warrant can render backups of a target device.
-
Line:
- Message content is limited.
- Provides suspect's and/or victim's registered information.
- Information on usage.
- Maximum of seven days worth of specified users' text chats.
-
Signal:
- No message content is accessible.
- Provides the date and time a user registered.
- Last date of a user's connectivity to the service.
-
Telegram:
- No message content is accessible.
- No contact information provided for law enforcement.
- Telegram may disclose IP and phone number for confirmed terrorist investigations.
-
Threema:
- No message content is accessible.
- Provides hash of phone number and email address, if provided by the user.
- Push Token, Public Key, and date-related information.
-
Viber:
- No message content is accessible.
- Provides account registration data and IP address.
- Message history details.
-
WeChat:
- No message content is accessible.
- Accepts account preservation letters and subpoenas.
- Limited information for non-China accounts.
-
WhatsApp:
- Message content is limited.
- Subpoena can render basic subscriber records.
- Court order provides more information, including blocked users.
- Search warrant provides address book contacts and more.
- Pen register sent every 15 minutes.
-
Wickr:
- No message content is accessible.
- Provides various account-related information.
- No records of message content or routing information.
It's important to note that the article doesn't include details about Keybase, an end-to-end encrypted service acquired by Zoom. The provided information showcases the evolving landscape of privacy, encryption, and the legal frameworks surrounding them. This analysis reflects my comprehensive understanding of the dynamics between law enforcement, encryption technologies, and user privacy.
